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LEGAL ARGUMENT
Petitioner-Appellant German Popoca-Garcia (hereinafter "Mr.
Popoca" or "Petitioner"), having received Respondent's brief on appeal,
herein files this Reply.
Given its jurisdiction to freely review the application of the relevant
law to the facts found by the district court, see Young v. State, 151 Idaho 52,
764 P.2d 129 (Ct. App. 1988), this Court should find that the district court's
determination that Mr. Popoca failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance
of his trial counsel be deemed clearly erroneous because (i) the incoherent
ntanner in which Mr. Popoca's prior attorney, Manuel Murdoch,
communicated his advice to Mr. Popoca was objectively deficient as a
matter of law, and (ii) Mr. Murdoch's confused communication of that
advice prejudiced ~1r. Popoca.
I.

Mr. Murdoch's inconsistent explanations about the
immigration consequences of the plea agreement fell
below an objective level of reasonableness, rendering
his representation deficient as a matter of law.

Mr. Murdoch's performance was objectively deficient as a matter of
law because the cumulative effect of his various inconsistent explanations
to Mr. Popoca about the immigration consequences of the plea offer

1

amounted to confusing, inconsistent advice when the consequence of
pleading guilty to the offense was crystal clear. The conviction for a sexual
abuse of a minor offense is an aggravated felony under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, appearing third on the list of aggravated felonies in
the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). Neither the district court nor the
parties to this appeal take the position that the consequence was unclear.
(Respondent's brief, p. 6; R., pp. 53-54, 92.) As a result of the inconsistent
and confusing mam1er in which he communicated his advice to Mr.
Popoca, Mr. Murdoch failed to carry out his constitutional duty to provide
clear advice under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010). In
this case, Mr. Murdoch was required to tell Mr. Popoca that it was virtually
certain that he would be deported as a result of his conviction. By failing to
clearly convey this advice, Mr. Murdoch violated his fundamental duty to
clearly communicate to his client information necessary to meet his client's
objective of avoiding deportation, thereby failing to provide
constitutionally competent representation under the Sixth Amendment.
The Supreme Court reached its decision in Padilla by applying the
test for ineffective assistance of counsel announced in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.s. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482.
2

Strickland, of course, requires an assessment of whether counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2052. Following the
standard laid down in Strickland, the Supreme Court concluded that
constitutionally effective assistance requires a defense attorney to
affirmatively advise a non-citizen defendant about the immigration
consequences of admitting guilt to an offense, and where, as here, the
consequences of pleading guilty are clear, the attorney's affirmative advice
must also be clear. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483.
The Supreme Court's conclusion in Padilla is consistent with, if not
grounded upon, the attorney's fundamental duty to communicate with
clients and keep them informed of decisions with respect to representation.
Communication is essential to the very nature of the attorney-client
relationship because the client trusts the attorney to work with the client to
achieve a desired result. The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
expressly provide that a lawyer "reasonably consult with the client about
the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished" and
" explain a n1atter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation." IDAHO RULES OF
3

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2), (b) (2004).1 See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (2000). Sin1i1arly, the
American Bar Association's Crilninal Justice Standards provide that
defense counsel has a duty to keep the client informed about developluents
arising in a case or plea discussion. See ABA Criminal Justice Standards,
Defense Function (3d ed. 1993) Standard 4-3.8(b); ABA Criminal Justice
Standards, Pleas of Guilty (3d ed. 1999) Standard 14-3.2(a), (f). Prevailing
professional norms also provide that the duty to clearly and accurately
communicate legal advice extends to an explanation of the consequences of
a plea bargain. See Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Assoc., Performance
Guidelines for Crin1inal Representation, Guideline 6.3(a) (1995) ("Counsel
should inform the client of any tentative negotiated agreement reached
with the prosecution, and explain to the client the full content of the
agreement, and the advantages and disadvantages and the potential
consequences of the agreement.").
1 The commentary further clarifies: "The client should have sufficient information to participate
intelligently in decisions concerning tl1e objectives of the representation and the means by which they are
to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends
in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, when there is time to explain a
proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before
proceeding to an agreement ... The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client
expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's
overall requirements as to the character of representation." IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R.
1.4 cmt. 5.
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In the course of plea negotiations, J\1r. Popoca's central objective was
to avoid a conviction that would trigger mandatory deportation. (R., pp. 68.) An attorney's duty to clearly communicate with a client is intimately
intertwined with the concurrent duty to generally abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and the means for
achieving those objectives. See IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R.
1.2(a),l.4(a)(2). The Supreme Court recently recognized the duty to
communicate clearly in the specific context of plea-bargaining in Missouri v.

Frye, 566 U.s. _ , 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, addressed defense counsel's duty of clarity in the context of
conveying the terms of a plea offer, stating that the general rule is that
"defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the
prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable
to the accused." Id.
Although there is no dispute that Mr. Popoca wanted to avoid
deportation, Mr. Nfurdoch's statements to the trial court and his assertions
as to what he told Mr. Popoca about the immigration consequences of
pleading guilty to the charged offense were anything but clear. Mr.
Murdoch told the trial court in Mr. Popoca's presence that Mr. Popoca
5

could be deported, and likely ,vould be deported, but also that it was unclear
whether he would be deported. (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 7-10; p. 24, L. 25 - p. 25, Ls.
1-6; p. 37, Ls. 18-21.) The only correct advice to give a Lawful Permanent
Resident who is poised to plead guilty to an aggravated felony under the
Immigration and Nationality Act is that the conviction will cause
deportation. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483. In Padilla, the Supreme Court
emphasized that this is not a matter of semantics: where the consequence is
clear - as it was for both the petitioner in Padilla and Mr. Popoca - precision
matters, and an attorney must communicate to the client that a guilty plea
will result in Virtually certain deportation. ld.
The district court decision neither addresses the mandate that the
attorney clearly comlnunicate to the client the immigration consequences of
a decision to plead guilty, nor discusses whether Mr. Murdoch discharged
this duty in light of his various inconsistent statements on this very point.
Rather, the district court's decision, and the Respondent's appellate
argument, hang upon only one of the many and various statements that
Mr. Murdoch made about the immigration consequences: specifically, that

at some point before entering the guilty plea, Mr. Murdoch managed to
accurately characterize the immigration consequences of the plea offer.
6

(Respondent's brief, pp. 5-6; R., pp. 93-95.) In order to arrive at this
conclusion, the district court and the Respondent rely upon Mr. tvfurdoch's
statement at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that, before appearing
at the change of plea hearing, he explained to Mr. Popoca that a guilty plea
to the charged offense 'would result in the loss of his permanent resident
status and deportation. (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 16-25 - p. 37, Ls. 4-6; R., pp. 93-94;
Respondent's brief, p. 6.) However, Mr. Murdoch said other things, too.
Mr. Murdoch admits that he equivocated in the advice he provided
to Mr. Popoca- specifically, that he told Mr. Popoca that the immigration
authorities could deport him for [the offense] and most likely would." (Tr.,
/I

p. 37, Ls. 18-21.) (emphasis added). Although both the district court and
Respondent suggest that Mr. Murdoch was appropriately disclosing the
immigration authorities' opinion about the immigration consequences of
Mr. Popoca's potential conviction, the relevant inquiry is whether Mr.
Murdoch explained the consequence of the guilty plea under the law. (Tr.,
p. 37, Ls. 11-15; R., p. 94; Respondent's brief, p. 6.) Booth v. State, 151 Idaho
612,619,262 P.3d 255, 262 (2011) (citing Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483).
Neither the district court nor the Respondent directly engage with
what Mr. Murdoch actually said on the record to the trial court (and in the
7

presence of Iv1r. Popoca) at the change of plea hearing: liMy client will most

likely have some immigration consequences to this. And I've inforn1.ed him
of this, that this could put his permanent resident status in jeopardy." (Tr.,
p. 11, Ls. 7-10.) (emphasis added). Mr. Murdoch also admitted at the
evidentiary hearing that this was an incorrect statement of law. (Tr., p. 49,
Ls.16-22.) While the district court acknowledged that this statement alone
was not sufficient to inform Mr. Popoca that his deportation was virtually
certain, the court did not consider the effect that this admittedly
inconsistent and incorrect statement of law made in open court might have
had on Mr. Popoca as he heard it. (R., p. 93.)
The district court decision does not explain how Mr. Murdoch
discharged his duty to tell Mr. Popoca that his conviction was virtually
certain to cause his deportation in light of his admitted inconsistent
statements to his client and the district court. (R., pp. 88-95.) Compliance
with defense counsel's obligations under Padilla requires the provision of
clear advice about clear consequences: that a guilty plea would result in
deportation. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483. Both the district court and the
Respondents acknow'ledge this. (R., p. 94; Respondent's brief, pp. 5-6.) In
light of the various other statements that Mr. Murdoch made about the
8

immigration consequences of Mr. Popoca's guilty plea, the district court's
reliance upon only one of those statements to conclude that Mr. Murdoch
discharged his constitutional duty to clearly explain to Mr. Popoca that his
deportation was a virtual certainty was legal error.
Since the Respondent did not address this undisputed erroneous
statement by Mr. Murdoch, Petitioner herein restates his position: that Mr.
Murdoch's hedging about the deportation consequences before the trial
court at the crucial moment when Mr. Popoca changed his plea to guilty
reflected Mr. Murdoch's own uncertainty about the consequences, and
amounts to conflicting and confusing legal advice. Further, the cumulative
effect of that conflicting and confusing advice deprived Mr. Popoca of
meaningful representation by failing to inform him of the virtual certainty
of deportation following conviction for the charged offense. Even if Mr.
Murdoch did, as the district court found, provide correct advice at some
tilne, that advice was nullified by the other statements made to Mr. Popoca
and to the trial court that directly conflict with what Mr. Murdoch testified
he explained to Mr. Popoca in private. See, e.g., State v. Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d
163, 173, 249 P.3d 1015, 1020 (Wash. 2011) ("The required advice about
immigration consequences would be a useless formality if, in the next
9

breath, counsel could give the noncitizen defendant the impression that he
or she should disregard what counsel just said about the risk of
immigration consequences.").
Although the district court correctly found that a violation of Padilla
occurs, if at all, before the plea is entered, Mr. Murdoch's statements at the
sentencing hearing are nonetheless relevant to determine his certainty
about the advice he professed to have given Mr. Popoca about the
consequences of a guilty plea. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Murdoch
repeated his hedging about the deportation consequences before the court:

[The prosecutor] said [Mr. Popoca] is going to be deported. It's
premature to say that. We don't know. That's going to have to run
through whatever proceedings immigration courts do. I do a lot
of immigration lazv. And I can say that it's unclear at this point
whether this 'luould actually result in a removal or not.
(Tr., p. 24, L. 25 - p. 25, Ls. 1-6.) (emphasis added). Either ~1r. Murdoch
was uncertain about the legal consequences of the conviction, or he was
certain but neglected to express his certainty to the trial court. This posthoc statement is relevant because the plain meaning of Mr. Murdoch's
explanation to the court continues to reflect his uncertainty regarding
deportation consequences.
10

II.

rvir. Murdoch's inconsistent explanations prejudiced
Mr. Popoca because it is reasonably probable that, but
for Mr. Murdoch's lack of clarity about the immigration
consequences of pleading guilty to the charged offense,
Mr. Popoca would have understood that the plea
virtually guaranteed deportation, and would have
instead insisted on going to trial.

The Respondent argues that even if Mr. Murdoch's representations
may be considered deficient, there is no actual prejudice to Mr. Popoca on
account of that deficiency because, during the plea colloquy, he answered
in the affirmative when the trial court asked if he was aware that he could
be deported as a consequence of his plea. Given Mr. Popoca's affirmative
response to the trial court's inquiry, the Respondent maintains that Mr.
Popoca's subsequent sworn statement in his post-conviction petition that
he would have taken his case to trial to avoid deportation amounts to
nothing more than mere retrospective dissatisfaction. (Respondent's brief,

p.7.)
Idaho Criminal Rule 11(d)(1) requires the trial court to inform all
defendants entering a guilty plea or making factual admissions during the
colloquy that the entry of the plea or the admission of certain facts could
have the consequence of deportation if the defendant is not a citizen. LC.R.
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11(d)(1). \Vhile warnings fronl the trial court about possible immigration
consequences may playa useful role in stimulating a conversation between
defense counsel and the defendant about those consequences, court
advisals during the plea colloquy can neither substitute for competent
advice from defense counsel, nor cure the prejudice flowing from counsel's
failure to advise about those consequences, because the Sixth Amendment
obligation of competence is a duty owed by defense counsel. Padilla, 130
S.Ct. at 1482, 1486. See, e.g., State v. Favela, No. 32,044, 2013 WL 6038868
(N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 8,2013), cert. granted, (N.M. Oct. 18, 2013) (No. 34,311)
(trial court's advice to defendant about immigration consequences at plea
proceeding does not cure failure of defense counsel to provide detailed
advice about such consequences). Cf United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635
F.3d 1237, 1240-41 (9th Cir. 2011) (failure of trial court to accurately inform
defendant of immigration consequences of guilty plea during colloquy was
not prejudicial error).
The central focus in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must
be on the prejudice arising from counsel's deficient performance, see United

States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 255 (4th Cir. 2012), and the legal standard
for evaluating prejudice requires that Mr. Popoca show a reasonable
12

possibility that, but for Mr. :tY1urdoch's deficiency, he would have
withdrawn his plea and insisted on going to trial, and that such a decision
would have been rational under the circumstances. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474

u.s. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985); Gilpin-Grub v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82,
57 P.3d 787, 793 (2002); McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 851, 103 P.3d 460,
464 (2004); Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1485. This standard of proof is "somewhat
lower" than the common preponderance of the evidence"
/I

standard. Strickland, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Petitioner herein submits that his dissatisfaction with Mr. Murdoch's
representations in his criminal proceedings is not merely retrospective
because Mr. Murdoch's failure to accurately and consistently communicate
the consequences that would inexorably flow from the entry of a guilty
plea frustrated the central objective sought by the Petitioner in the course
of representation-avoiding mandatory deportation. Not only does Mr.
Popoca swear that he would have rejected the plea offer had he known
about the guaranteed deportation consequence (R., p. 8.), but Mr. Murdoch
also stated that Mr. Popoca's immigration status "was a big part of our
discussions" when they discussed the plea agreement. (Tr., p. 35, Ls. 21-

25.) See also Immigration & Naturalization Servo
13

V.

St. Cyr, 533

U.s. 289,

322, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (2001) ("There can be little doubt that, as a general

matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea
agreement are acutely aware of the irnn1igration consequences of their
convictions.").
If Mr. Popoca were convicted after trial for the charged offense of

Lewd Conduct with a Minor under Sixteen, he would have faced a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment. I.C. § 18-1508. However, Mr.
Popoca had earned permanent residency and made the United States his
home; although he would have risked a longer prison term by going to
trial, the deportation consequence of his guilty plea is also" a particularly
severe 'penalty.1f' Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481. For criminal defendants,
deportation, no less than prison, can mean "banishment or exile," Delgadillo

v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-91, 68 S.Ct. 10 (1947), and" separation from
their families," Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1484. Given the severity of the
deportation consequence, Mr. Popoca ,,y'ould have been rational to take his
chances at trial. See, e.g., Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d at 175-176 (defendant's afterthe-fact statement that he would have rejected plea and gone to trial
despite facing a maximum life sentence deemed rational under the

14

circumstances). Therefore, Mr. Popoca has proved that his counsel's
unreasonable advice prejudiced him.
CONCLUSION

The Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court vacate the dish-ict
court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand
this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 28 th day of January, 2014.

Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of January, 2014, I served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by
causing to be placed a copy thereof in the u.s. Mail, addressed to:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
Criminal Division of the State of Idaho
700 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 210
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
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